Andrea Altobrando "On a Possibility of a Phenomenological-Husserlian Monadology"

"On a Possibility of a Phenomenological-Husserlian Monadology"

Andrea Altobrando（日本学術振興会／北海道大学）


The terms “monad” has a peculiarly strong ontological as well as metaphysical “taste”. The fact that Husserl uses the term “monad” in order to describe the transcendental as well as empirical subject seems in fact to support the idea that his theory of the “phenomenological field of evidence” as well as of “subjectivity” (the two concepts often coinciding) leads to solipsism. This last is principally considered epistemological. Nevertheless, exactly the use of the term “monad” seems to suggest some sort of solipsism also from an ontological point of view. Quite bewildering is then that Husserl makes large use of this term in the 5th Cartesian Meditation, which is devoted to the analyses of intersubjectivity and to its establishment as most fundamental transcendental ground of knowledge and experience.

In order to understand if and how Husserl’s use of the term “monad” is consistent with his general phenomenological frames (especially “intuitionism” and “epoche”) and which can be the systematic consequences of the “monadological” view of subjectivity, I will briefly sketch the path of considerations and reflections which seems to lead Husserl to the adoption of the concept of monad in its phenomenological philosophy. I will show which can be some analogies with Leibniz’ conceptions, not in order to make a precise comparison between the two, but rather i) to better point out the peculiarities of Husserl’s framework and to ward off misunderstandings, as well as ii) to track down its possible inconsistences or aporias.